

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-07

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R 220803Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2972

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 0746

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, PK, IN, AF, US

SUBJ: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

1. AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN AND I HAD AN INTERESTING SESSION MORNING OF JANUARY 21 WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY AFHA SHAHI. SHAHI OBVIOUSLY LOOKED UPON MOYNIHAN AS A VISITOR OF UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE, SAYING THAT THEY HAD NOT HAD A CHANCE TO TALK WITH AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO INDIA FOR A LONG, LONG TIME. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD BEEN IN ERROR, BUT HAD OFTEN FELT IN THE PAST THAT OUR AMBASSADORS IN INDIA TOOK A PAROCHIAL VIEW OF THINGS IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, SEEING THINGS SOMEWHAT TOO MUCH IN THEIR OPINION THROUGH INDIAN EYES. HE HOPED THAT MOYNIHAN COULD GET A FEEL WHILE HERE AS TO HOW THE PAKISTANIS LOOKED AT THINGS.

2. SHAHI TALKED IN HISTORICAL TERMS OF THE ANIMOSITY

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BUILD-UP IN INDIAN OPINION TOWARDS PAKISTAN IN THE TIME OF

NEHRU. ONE OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS SEEMED TO BE A RESENTMENT THAT PAKISTAN HAD SOUGHT TO MOVE AWAY FROM NEHRU'S NEUTRALISM AND BECOME ALIGNED WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN THE EYES OF NEHRU THIS SEEMED TO BE BRINGING THE COLD WAR OF THAT AGE TO THE SUB-CONTINENT.

3. THIS HAD PROBABLY HEIGHTENED THEIR PROBLEMS OVER KASHMIR. HE TALKED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM AT SOME LENGTH, SAYING IN EFFECT THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO BRING MATTERS TO HEAD IN KASHMIR, BUT POLITICALLY COULD NEVER GIVE UP THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

4. HE SAID THAT BASICALLY THEIR PROBLEMS WITH INDIA SEEMED TO DERIVE MOSTLY FROM INDIA'S POSSESSION OF THE "PARAMOUNT POWER" FEELING THAT SHE SEEMED TO HAVE. HE SAID THAT QUITE OBVIOUSLY INDIA WAS THE PARAMOUNT POWER OF THE SUBACONTINENT, AND THAT THIS WAS A REALITY WHICH PAKISTAN READILY FACED UP TO. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT INDIA HAS TO AN EXTENT RETAINED THE OLD BRITISH CONCEPT OF THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE. HE CITED PAST INCIDENTS WHERE IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THE BRITISH HAD USED THIS THEORY TO DO ANYTHING THEY REALLY WANTED TO DO, REGARDLESS OF TREATY OR OTHER UNDERSTANDINGS OR AGREEMENTS, AND CARRIED TO THIS EXTENT IT COULD BE LOOKED UPON TO LEGITIMIZE ANY ACT, EVEN AS REGARDS INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS. PAKISTAN JUST COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS OUTLOOK, AS TO DO SO WOULD BE TO ADMIT THAT THEY HAD A LESSER SOVEREIGNTY THAN HAD INDIA.

5. SHAHI CARRIED ON THIS LINE OF THINKING OVER INTO THE MILITARY SUPPLY FIELD. HE WAS RESTRAINED YET SPOKE WITH CONSIDERABLE FEELINGS. HE SAID INDIA SEEMED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD HAVE NO DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. HE SAID THAT INDIA NEED HAVE NO FEAR OF ANY AGGRESSION AT PAK INITIATIVE, BUT PAKISTAN COULD HARDLY CONTEMPLATE EXISTENCE AS A SOVEREIGN NATION IF THEY DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT POTENTIAL TO STAND UP AGAINST INDIA, EVEN FOR A FEW WEEKS, UNTIL OUTSIDE PRESSURES COULD BE BROUGHT TO PLAY. HE SAID THAT A COUNTRY WITH LESS THAN THAT CAPABILITY COULD IN THE END HARDLY AFFORD TO CARRY ON A REALLY

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INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY, AND FEEL THE ASSURANCE OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY. HE EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH THAT OUR POLICY TOWARDS THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS IN PRACTICE NOT EQUAL TREATMENT, EVEN THOUGH HE KNEW THAT WE MEANT IT TO BE SO. AS FACTORS HE LISTED INDIA'S OWN INDIGENOUS ARMS CAPABILITY AND THE FACT THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AHEAD WITH SUPPLY. HE SAID PAKISTAN HAD NO CAPABILITY OF ITS OWN, AND THAT THE CHINESE

ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN WAS GREATLY EXAGGERATED BY INDIA, EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW THAT THE CHINESE MATERIEL WAS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE. SHAHI SPOKE OF THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN ARTICLE IV OF THE SEATO CHARTER AND LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET-INDIAN AGREEMENTS, AND MADE THE POINT THAT IN 1971 SEATO DID NOT EVEN BOTHER TO TALK ABOUT THE WAS IN INDIA, WHILE THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY SUPPORTED THE INDIANS RE BANGLADESH. (NONE OF THIS WAS IN BITTER TERMS AS SHAHI WAS AT HIS DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY BEST.)

6. MOYNIHAN THANKED SHAHI FOR HIS ARTICULATE EXPRESSION OF THEIR FEELINGS. HE SAID IN A WAY HE WAS GETTING A MIRROR IMAGE HERE OF THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN HE HEARD SO MUCH OF IN INDIA. HE SAID IT WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL TO HIM TO HAVE THIS KIND OF TALK AS IT LED TO BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF THE TOTAL PROBLEMS OF THE SUB-CONTINENT. HE RECALLED MANY CONVERSATIONS OF HIS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALDOM IN WHICH THEY HAD ACCUSED US OF BEING EXTREMELY IMPARTIAL ON THE PAK SIDE OF THINGS. AS EXTREMES, HE HAD HEARD THE UNITED STATES ACCUSED OF HAVING "INVADED" THE BAY OF BENGAL IN 1971 AND OF MINING CHITTAGONG HARBOR.

7. THERE FOLLOWED A GENERAL DISCUSSION PARTLY IN AN INTERNATIONAL LAW CONTEXT OF THE THEORY OF "PARAMOUNT POWER." AT THE END OF THIS, MOYNIHAN THANKED SHAHI FOR EXPRESSING HIS FEELINGS ON THIS SUBJECT, SAYING THAT IT WOULD SERVE TO MAKE HIM MORE ALERT TO THE SENSITIVENESS OF FEELINGS ON THIS QUESTION. I INTERJECTED THAT PERHAPS THIS WAS A SITUATION IN WHICH A "GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY" WAS CALLED FOR.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 0746

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8. SHAHI TALKED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AGAIN WITH REFERENCE TO U.S. MILITARY SUPPLY. I TOOK THE OCCASION TO DEBUNK SOME OF OUR RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, SAYING THAT IT APPEARED NOW THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MAJOR DELIVERIES OF MATERIEL, AND THAT WHAT HAD COME HAD FOR THE MOST PART BEEN ARRANGED FOR BEFORE THE DAUD COUP.

9. MOYNIHAN WAS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN DESCRIBING THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND SPEECH HE HAD MADE TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE IN INDIA. HE WENT BRIEFLY INTO EACH OF THE FIVE POINTS THAT HE HAD MADE, BUT DEALT MORE EXTENSIVELY WITH HIS MAJOR THEME THAT BOTH INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAD MAJOR INTERESTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. AS THE DEPARTMENT HAS THIS SPEECH, I SHALL NOT REPORT IN DETAIL EXCEPT THAT MOYNIHAN HAD STRESSED THAT IF INDIA COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN WERE VERY IMPORTANT TO US, THEN INDIA
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AND THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT REALLY COME VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER. SHAHI WAS IMPRESSED AND I PROMISED TO GET TO HIM A COPY OF THE MOYNIHAN SPEECH.

10. SHAHI AT THE END ATTEMPTED TO SUMMARIZE THE MAIN POINTS HE HAD MADE:

(A) PAKISTAN SAW ONLY FUTILITY FOR ALL IN ANY FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SUB-CONTINENT.

(B) PAKISTAN NEEDED ENOUGH SOPHISTICATED ARMS SO AS TO NOT BE LEFT COMPLETELY OUTSIDE THE BALL GAME.

(C) PAKISTAN WOULD NOT GO TO WAR EVEN OVER KASHMIR, BUT IN THE MEANTIME HAD TO PUBLICLY MAINTAIN ITS POLICY OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

(D) BASICALLY PAKISTAN JUST WANTED INDIA TO LEAVE IT

ALONE.

(E) IN SPITE OF THE LATTER, HOWEVER, IT WAS SINCERE
IN WISHING FURTHER NORMALIZATION. IT WAS WILLING TO WORK
IN THAT DIRECTION WHEREVER POSSIBLE WITH THE HOPE THAT
PAKISTAN COULD CO-EXIST WITH INDIA IN THE SAME
MANNER THAT CANADA AND MEXICO DO WITH THE UNITED
STATES. HE SAID PAKISTAN WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT A LESSER
STATUS, SUCH AS CANADA AND MEXICO HAD VIS-A-VIS THE
UNITED STATES, IF INDIA WOULD COOPERATE AND GRADUALLY
GET OUT OF SOME OF THE ARROGANCE OF THEIR POSITION AS
THE "PARAMOUNT POWER."
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